For professional and personal reasons I have devoured the news on Ukraine over the last four months. I have read some excellent analyses of Putin’s, if not Russia’s, agenda and on the pre-existing fault lines between NATO member states. I have also read articles that can only be classed as a crass form of appeasement; the less said about those the better. Excellent or abysmal, these articles have shared certain common characteristics. They tend to start by asking not if Russia will invade, but when.
An exposition follows about the possible point of incursion: from the north through Belarus, from the east masked as a “reinforcement of besieged ethnic Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk”, or from the south in an effort to harden bases in Crimea and as a precursor to an attack on Odessa, which would serve to finalise Russia’s control over vital sea lanes, place Ukraine in a political and economic stranglehold, and provide Russia with a secure corridor to its “peacekeeping troops” in Transdniestria. Within that exposition Ukraine is reduced to its basic geography; it is the battlefield upon which Russian, Ukrainian and NATO forces will meet. Alternatively, it is portrayed as a pawn in the high stakes chess match between Russia and NATO; useful, but ultimately expendable.
Rarely is it viewed as a prize to be won in its own right. For Russia, Ukraine is a means to an end, whether that be the recreation of empire, the creation of a buffer zone, or the shoring up of the regime in the face of domestic political and economic fragility. And for the West? Ukraine tends to be viewed as the bulwark against Russian revanchism.
In reading these articles I have been frustrated by two issues. First, is the implicit assumption that a Russian deployment of conventional forces constitutes a new, or renewed, act of war. It does not. The reality is that Ukraine has not had a moment’s peace for the last 8 years. With 7.1% of its territory occupied (CIA, 2021), over 14,000 dead (International Crisis Group, 2021), 1.5 million IDPs (UNHCR, 2021) and over 20,000 refugees and asylum seekers (Macrotrends, 2021) since 2014, it is evident that Ukraine is at war. Its economy has been affected, it has had legislation regarding the governance of the disputed territories imposed upon it by a peace process, Minsk II, widely viewed as flawed, and it has been subject to regular cyber-attacks. Ukraine is fighting a hybrid war. Media reports on the conflict do everyone, but especially Ukraine, a disservice by focusing only on the conventional element.
The second issue that has caused irritation is the failure to acknowledge that Ukraine has agency. Ukraine is more than a series of lines on a map. It is a place with people, history, culture and its own political and economic reality. It has agency, if not particularly reliable allies. Although its politicians may have dithered in the past about whether to join the EU and NATO, for the last 8 years Ukraine has pursued a consistent foreign policy, which is more than can be said for some of its allies. In 2014 Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU which included the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Economic reforms initiated in 2014 sought to establish the basis for the closer alignment of Ukraine’s economy with that of the EU. In February 2019, then President Poroshenko signed a constitutional amendment committing Ukraine to becoming a member of NATO and the EU. That was the choice of the Ukrainian government and the people that it serves. In a 2021 survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, 54% of respondents indicated that they would vote for NATO membership, but many recognised that for the foreseeable future Ukraine would have to rely on its efforts alone to ensure its security.
As I watch events unfold in Ukraine, I am left pondering a series of questions: Do Ukraine’s erstwhile allies know what game they are playing? Do they understand the rules or how long that competition will last? Do they know what winning would look like? Essentially, do they have a strategy? And in asking whether they have a strategy I am not thinking in terms solely of a military strategy, but of a holistic one that provides a political, economic and military vision for engagement with and support to Ukraine, but also to Georgia, Moldova and the rest of the Partnership for Peace states. I fear that the answer to each of the questions I pose is the same: No. I also fear that Putin would have very considered responses should similar questions be posed regarding Russia’s intentions.
Based on the research that I have undertaken I know that the equipment and training the Ukrainian armed forces received between 2014 and 2021 are viewed with appreciation and are credited with saving lives. If the current crisis is deescalated successfully then I suspect that America’s commitment of rapid reaction forces and the bolstering of allied capabilities in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, as well as the UK’s shipment of anti-tank missiles and promise of further support to professional military education will be viewed in a similar light. At the end of the episode, however, the question will remain: Is there a long-term strategy or are we incapable of anything other than a reactive approach to train and equip?
I recognise that these are difficult questions to answer, especially at a time when Western capitals are still reeling from the ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan. In a Financial Times’ survey published on 3 February 2022, only in Denmark and the US were people more likely than not to say that their country should be willing to use military force to aid Ukraine, but the level of support was less than 40% in both cases.
In the UK, despite the rhetoric employed in the Integrated Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy Review (2021) regarding persistent engagement and a “campaign approach to building partner nation’s capabilities”, the reality is that neither the public nor the politicians have an appetite for enduring campaigns. We failed in Afghanistan, and we failed the Afghan people. Based on current evidence we appear keen to fail again in Ukraine. The lack of coordination and commitment amongst Ukraine’s allies is certainly the subject of the messaging emanating from Moscow. Those respondents to the Razumkov survey cited above have provided a fairly realistic assessment of Ukraine’s security situation.
In the articles I have read there have been repeated calls for a return to a Realist approach in our dealings with Russia. I share that perspective, but I would suggest that to be successful such an approach requires good situational awareness, a detailed understanding of the motivation and limitations of all of the actors involved and a clear strategy. Knowing what we want to achieve and how is an absolute necessity if we want the current diplomatic efforts to succeed. Ensuring that Ukraine is an equal party to those discussions and not just a subject discussed by others is equally important for the permanence of a solution.
It should be evident by now that I think Ukraine matters. The choices that it makes and the events that unfold there are relevant to the security of all in Europe, whether you want to think about that security in a holistic sense or parcel it out into its political, economic, social, legal and military dimensions. I also believe that we are stronger together.
As we approach the date of Russia’s military exercises with Belarus and the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, I fervently hope that war can be averted, but I also hope that we do not find ourselves in exactly the same situation in a few months or years wondering how we got here and what we should do. We need to do more than simply publish glossy documents that we call strategies, we need to think strategically. If we don’t do so now, when will we?
