The link for the Conference is as follows:

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This is the link to KCL’s press release on the event:

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For professional and personal reasons I have devoured the news on Ukraine over the last four months.  I have read some excellent analyses of Putin’s, if not Russia’s, agenda and on the pre-existing fault lines between NATO member states.  I have also read articles that can only be classed as a crass form of appeasement; the less said about those the better.  Excellent or abysmal, these articles have shared certain common characteristics.  They tend to start by asking not if Russia will invade, but when. 

An exposition follows about the possible point of incursion: from the north through Belarus, from the east masked as a “reinforcement of besieged ethnic Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk”, or from the south in an effort to harden bases in Crimea and as a precursor to an attack on Odessa, which would serve to finalise Russia’s control over vital sea lanes, place Ukraine in a political and economic stranglehold, and provide Russia with a secure corridor to its “peacekeeping troops” in Transdniestria.   Within that exposition Ukraine is reduced to its basic geography; it is the battlefield upon which Russian, Ukrainian and NATO forces will meet.  Alternatively, it is portrayed as a pawn in the high stakes chess match between Russia and NATO; useful, but ultimately expendable. 

Rarely is it viewed as a prize to be won in its own right.  For Russia, Ukraine is a means to an end, whether that be the recreation of empire, the creation of a buffer zone, or the shoring up of the regime in the face of domestic political and economic fragility.  And for the West?  Ukraine tends to be viewed as the bulwark against Russian revanchism.

In reading these articles I have been frustrated by two issues.  First, is the implicit assumption that a Russian deployment of conventional forces constitutes a new, or renewed, act of war.  It does not.  The reality is that Ukraine has not had a moment’s peace for the last 8 years.  With 7.1% of its territory occupied (CIA, 2021), over 14,000 dead (International Crisis Group, 2021), 1.5 million IDPs (UNHCR, 2021) and over 20,000 refugees and asylum seekers (Macrotrends, 2021) since 2014, it is evident that Ukraine is at war.  Its economy has been affected, it has had legislation regarding the governance of the disputed territories imposed upon it by a peace process, Minsk II, widely viewed as flawed, and it has been subject to regular cyber-attacks.  Ukraine is fighting a hybrid war.  Media reports on the conflict do everyone, but especially Ukraine, a disservice by focusing only on the conventional element.

The second issue that has caused irritation is the failure to acknowledge that Ukraine has agency.  Ukraine is more than a series of lines on a map.  It is a place with people, history, culture and its own political and economic reality.  It has agency, if not particularly reliable allies.  Although its politicians may have dithered in the past about whether to join the EU and NATO, for the last 8 years Ukraine has pursued a consistent foreign policy, which is more than can be said for some of its allies.  In 2014 Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU which included the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.  Economic reforms initiated in 2014 sought to establish the basis for the closer alignment of Ukraine’s economy with that of the EU.  In February 2019, then President Poroshenko signed a constitutional amendment committing Ukraine to becoming a member of NATO and the EU.  That was the choice of the Ukrainian government and the people that it serves. In a 2021 survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, 54% of respondents indicated that they would vote for NATO membership, but many recognised that for the foreseeable future Ukraine would have to rely on its efforts alone to ensure its security.

As I watch events unfold in Ukraine, I am left pondering a series of questions: Do Ukraine’s erstwhile allies know what game they are playing? Do they understand the rules or how long that competition will last? Do they know what winning would look like?  Essentially, do they have a strategy? And in asking whether they have a strategy I am not thinking in terms solely of a military strategy, but of a holistic one that provides a political, economic and military vision for engagement with and support to Ukraine, but also to Georgia, Moldova and the rest of the Partnership for Peace states.  I fear that the answer to each of the questions I pose is the same: No.  I also fear that Putin would have very considered responses should similar questions be posed regarding Russia’s intentions.

Based on the research that I have undertaken I know that the equipment and training the Ukrainian armed forces received between 2014 and 2021 are viewed with appreciation and are credited with saving lives.  If the current crisis is deescalated successfully then I suspect that America’s commitment of rapid reaction forces and the bolstering of allied capabilities in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, as well as the UK’s shipment of anti-tank missiles and promise of further support to professional military education will be viewed in a similar light.  At the end of the episode, however, the question will remain: Is there a long-term strategy or are we incapable of anything other than a reactive approach to train and equip?

I recognise that these are difficult questions to answer, especially at a time when Western capitals are still reeling from the ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan. In a Financial Times’ survey published on 3 February 2022, only in Denmark and the US were people more likely than not to say that their country should be willing to use military force to aid Ukraine, but the level of support was less than 40% in both cases. 

In the UK, despite the rhetoric employed in the Integrated Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy Review (2021) regarding persistent engagement and a “campaign approach to building partner nation’s capabilities”, the reality is that neither the public nor the politicians have an appetite for enduring campaigns.  We failed in Afghanistan, and we failed the Afghan people.  Based on current evidence we appear keen to fail again in Ukraine.  The lack of coordination and commitment amongst Ukraine’s allies is certainly the subject of the messaging emanating from Moscow.  Those respondents to the Razumkov survey cited above have provided a fairly realistic assessment of Ukraine’s security situation.

In the articles I have read there have been repeated calls for a return to a Realist approach in our dealings with Russia.  I share that perspective, but I would suggest that to be successful such an approach requires good situational awareness, a detailed understanding of the motivation and limitations of all of the actors involved and a clear strategy.  Knowing what we want to achieve and how is an absolute necessity if we want the current diplomatic efforts to succeed.  Ensuring that Ukraine is an equal party to those discussions and not just a subject discussed by others is equally important for the permanence of a solution.  

It should be evident by now that I think Ukraine matters.  The choices that it makes and the events that unfold there are relevant to the security of all in Europe, whether you want to think about that security in a holistic sense or parcel it out into its political, economic, social, legal and military dimensions.  I also believe that we are stronger together. 

As we approach the date of Russia’s military exercises with Belarus and the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, I fervently hope that war can be averted, but I also hope that we do not find ourselves in exactly the same situation in a few months or years wondering how we got here and what we should do.  We need to do more than simply publish glossy documents that we call strategies, we need to think strategically.  If we don’t do so now, when will we?

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Laura Cleary Chaired a panel entitled ‘Altruism, Ambition and Absorptive Capacity: Matching Security Cooperation to Partner Nation Requirements’ at the IUS conference in October. She was joined on the panel by colleagues from the Institute for Defence Analyses and by former colleagues from Cranfield University.  Laura’s paper, ‘From Abstract to Actual: The Concepts and Practice of Accountability’ drew on research conducted for her recent book, Managing Security: Concepts and Challenges.

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The questions of ‘What is security?’ and ‘How can governments deliver it in the most efficient and effective manner?’ are central to this volume. The text explores the ways in which security might be achieved, providing readers with the guiding principles of security governance and management. Those principles are illustrated through reference to the experiences of countries engaged in reform of their security institutions, allowing the reader to identify continuities and discontinuities in the process of change within the security sector. Written by practitioners for practitioners, the book provides readers with a framework with which to assess and respond to first-, second- and third-generation issues within SSR. All chapters include an introduction to the topic, empirical case studies, and exercises to encourage readers to reflect upon their own experiences of governing and managing security.

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The publication of Global Britain in a Competitive Age: An Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (16 March 2021) sets forth the Government’s analysis of and agenda for security until 2030.  In a series of articles analysts at Oakwood International Security examine key aspects of the Integrated Review and the accompanying Defence Command Paper (22 March 2021).  In the third article within the series, Roger Darby looks at the implications for Human Resource Management in defence.

Analysis of the global defence and security sector in the British Government’s recent Integrated Security Review and Defence Command Paper highlighted the central tenet of change. Namely, the status quo is no longer acceptable, desirable, or realistic. Stating it more bluntly, Britain’s military capability cannot stand still. Although change is a constant, however, it is important to stress that change is not consistent. For example, the security professional of the future will look very different from the security professional of today. 

The recent publication of the Integrated Review of Security and the Defence Command Paper also focused attention on the UK MOD’s requirement to address the quantity v. quality conundrum.  Traditionally, quantity, or mass in military parlance, has been viewed as a critical enabler in the attainment of effect. In the past, human resource planning was mainly about determining size (quantity).  However, the nature of the risks the UK faces now and in the future means that scale will be less important than capability.  As identified in the Defence Command Paper, emphasis has demonstrably shifted on the need to focus more on a qualitative approach.  HRM (human resource management) strategies will need to enable reduced permanent forces to carry out more diverse tasks, ones that will only emerge in the future.  This in turn requires a more flexible workforce with transferable skills ready to meet the needs of the different defence ‘spaces’ including operating in a so-called ‘grey zone’ between peace and war. This presents changing requirements in a multiplicity of locations and diverse and often, contradictory environments, as highlighted in the diagram below.

An intriguing backdrop to the recent review is the question of whether the tempo and persistent global engagement will seriously challenge the UK’s armed forces capability in the different spaces, in the future. For example, light, high-tech and globally deployed troops lie at the heart of this Command Paper, however, a lighter, more agile, and more global army also has more weaknesses, for example, in combat support. The British government has acknowledged it will need to augment reduced personnel numbers through continuous investment in ships, submarines, combat aircraft, new technology, and unmanned platforms if they are to counter successfully the unprecedented challenges of cyber security and prepare for conflicts wholly unlike those in the past 20 years.  Consequently, increased demands for more skilled security personnel will include for example, cyber-soldiers, satellite controllers and software engineers. A cohort of personnel that are already at a premium in the wider competitive labour market. 

From an HRM perspective, three issues raise concerns. First, the central role of human capital needs to be acknowledged more fully in strategic reviews and defence plans.  That includes identifying the correct ‘quantity’ of personnel (juxtaposing a planned decrease in the number of permanent staff with an increase in the number of reservists) to suit a multiplicity of spaces and situational contexts.   Indeed, General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, noted in the Defence Paper that army strength will be reduced from 82,500 to 72,500 troops (the smallest size since 1714). This is contrasted with an increase to 30,000 reserve troops with 6 months readiness who will be made available and added to the overall numbers. 

Second, there is a long-term requirement for HR strategic planning and resourcing to ensure the availability of ‘quality’ staff with the necessary skills, knowledge, and experience to be flexible and agile enough to meet the changing requirements within short, medium, and long-term time frames. History has not been kind in this area of defence management, with old habits still prevalent and witnessed in poor strategic HR management.  Some commentators would argue that the same is true in defence procurement and acquisition.

Third, there is the ubiquitous issue of timing – cuts naturally create personnel gaps exacerbating knowledge gaps which can linger unfilled for many years. Take for example the Navy, which will have to shrink before it can grow to its larger planned size. In procurement terms, one can also see there is often a ‘knowledge gap’ between the business and the security service when buying new equipment. 

It is contended in this article that the UK MOD needs to be more professional in coming to terms with the concept of HRM, and not before time. This connotes a change of mindset in institutions that will acknowledge that people are a key asset; whilst also recognising the need for employee engagement to ensure staff are managed more effectively, efficiently and economically.  Consequently, relevant, updated HR management and leadership skills are of paramount importance for the modernisation of defence and security forces. The demand for more relevant, updated HR management and leadership capability has occurred in many Forces around the world where defence budgets have fluctuated but demand for security services has remained constant if more complex.    The reality is that the British Armed Forces, similar to many others across the globe, will experience rationalization, restructuring and increasing complexity in all of the operating spaces.

As in all sectors, Defence faces an uncertain future.  That uncertainty will inevitably affect key management practices like HRM. Various critical questions about human capital requirements, suitably trained staff and financial cost will continue to emerge in parallel with future national and international challenges to the country’s economic, social, political, cyber and security environments. 

The over-arching theme in this article has been that ‘people’ are the most important asset in any organisation.  To-date, however, they have been the most expensive and the most poorly managed asset. To continue the cycle of waste and misuse of talent will be seen as an example of bad management practice.  No organisation, including the UK MOD can afford this perception if it wishes to maintain its capability and sustainability in the future and remain relevant in a fast-changing, complex, and uncertain global security environment.

For too long the armed forces in the UK have been driven by over-ambition and over-spending from governments unwilling to be honest about the cost of defence.  The latest Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, purportedly began his major review by telling officials to do away with spreadsheets and focus on the ‘threat’. To counter the threat requires resources, however, and this defence paper is evasive on many details – including the size and timing of investments. While commentators have suggested the Defence Command Paper is bold and visionary, it remains to be seen whether it will be properly funded….and, more crucially, the armed forces appropriately staffed, for an uncertain future.

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Within the Review itself, implementation is covered in just two and a half pages.  Although not explicitly stated, implementation seems to envisage a portfolio approach with the National Security Council (NSC) at the apex.  The supporting structures introduced by the 2018 National Security Capability Review are deemed to be sufficient to enable implementation, although the need to improve coherence, structure and coordinated delivery is acknowledged.  As is often the case with major programmes of reform, the need for greater flexibility and agility is identified.   This is easy to say, but much more difficult to achieve, as it requires changes in individual and group culture and behaviour, less prescriptive processes and greater investment in agile systems.  It is not clear that these fundamental changes are recognised.

Although the departmental cross-cutting challenges are recognised, the difficulty of achieving a coherent, integrated approach must not be underestimated.  Some elements of the review associated with the delivery of new technologies and systems can best be managed using traditional project and programme management techniques. Some departments, notably the Ministry of Defence, which manage the delivery of large, capital-intensive projects on a regular basis, already have the required structures and processes in place and can readily apply them to the delivery of the integrated review.  That is not to say that improvements can’t be made, and delivery of new defence capabilities to time, cost and performance remains a perennial problem.  Other departments do not have this sort of experience.  Therefore, the question is whether the required skills and processes are developed within the ministries where they are currently lacking, or whether a single ministry takes the lead for these types of activities on a cross-cutting basis across government.

The second approach has clear advantages in terms of efficiency and effectiveness but, at the same time, raises questions regarding the flow of funding, prioritisation and the ability of any single department to put aside internal loyalties and act for the common good across government.

Another key question is how delivery performance will be assessed and dependencies managed across such a wide range of disparate but heavily inter-related activities.  Tight governance can be imposed on technology-led programmes, but unless the other change activities are delivered that investment in technology could be worthless. A well-publicised current example of a lack of this joined-up approach is ‘Track and Trace’ where a technically successful system is of limited value when the associated social changes which support and encourage individuals to self-isolate are not in place.  Many of these dependencies will cut across departments and further emphasise the need for a strong, portfolio-led methodology that can recognise and manage these cross-cutting issues.  Clear leadership is also a key requisite.

While the strategic content of the Integrated Review can be discussed at length it is vitally important that its delivery is considered from the outset.  Without effective leadership and coordinated management structures and processes in place, the Integrated Review will most likely remain an interesting discussion piece rather than a catalyst for the effective establishment of Global Britain.

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