Although one can argue at length about the aims of the Integrated Review and the policies within it, no one can doubt the scope of what it is trying to deliver. The scope is vast and cuts across traditional departmental boundaries, encompasses technology-led change, requires the development of new skills, changes traditional international relationships and introduces new organisations and operating processes. But therein lies the problem; the ambitious scope is matched by the equally huge challenges of delivery.
Within the Review itself, implementation is covered in just two and a half pages. Although not explicitly stated, implementation seems to envisage a portfolio approach with the National Security Council (NSC) at the apex. The supporting structures introduced by the 2018 National Security Capability Review are deemed to be sufficient to enable implementation, although the need to improve coherence, structure and coordinated delivery is acknowledged. As is often the case with major programmes of reform, the need for greater flexibility and agility is identified. This is easy to say, but much more difficult to achieve, as it requires changes in individual and group culture and behaviour, less prescriptive processes and greater investment in agile systems. It is not clear that these fundamental changes are recognised.
Although the departmental cross-cutting challenges are recognised, the difficulty of achieving a coherent, integrated approach must not be underestimated. Some elements of the review associated with the delivery of new technologies and systems can best be managed using traditional project and programme management techniques. Some departments, notably the Ministry of Defence, which manage the delivery of large, capital-intensive projects on a regular basis, already have the required structures and processes in place and can readily apply them to the delivery of the integrated review. That is not to say that improvements can’t be made, and delivery of new defence capabilities to time, cost and performance remains a perennial problem. Other departments do not have this sort of experience. Therefore, the question is whether the required skills and processes are developed within the ministries where they are currently lacking, or whether a single ministry takes the lead for these types of activities on a cross-cutting basis across government.
The second approach has clear advantages in terms of efficiency and effectiveness but, at the same time, raises questions regarding the flow of funding, prioritisation and the ability of any single department to put aside internal loyalties and act for the common good across government.
Another key question is how delivery performance will be assessed and dependencies managed across such a wide range of disparate but heavily inter-related activities. Tight governance can be imposed on technology-led programmes, but unless the other change activities are delivered that investment in technology could be worthless. A well-publicised current example of a lack of this joined-up approach is ‘Track and Trace’ where a technically successful system is of limited value when the associated social changes which support and encourage individuals to self-isolate are not in place. Many of these dependencies will cut across departments and further emphasise the need for a strong, portfolio-led methodology that can recognise and manage these cross-cutting issues. Clear leadership is also a key requisite.
While the strategic content of the Integrated Review can be discussed at length it is vitally important that its delivery is considered from the outset. Without effective leadership and coordinated management structures and processes in place, the Integrated Review will most likely remain an interesting discussion piece rather than a catalyst for the effective establishment of Global Britain.
